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Abstract 
We investigate delegated monitoring by examining the determinants and effects of 
including cross-acceleration provisions in public debt contracts. We find that cross-
acceleration provision use depends on borrowers’ going concern relative to liquidation 
values, debt repayment structures, credit quality, and financial reporting quality.  This 
suggests that the use of cross-acceleration provisions increases when the costs of 
cascading defaults are lower, the conflicts between creditor classes are higher, and the 
benefits of delegating monitoring to banks are higher. We also find a lower interest rate 
on public debt contracts with cross-acceleration provisions, but the rate reduction 
depends on borrowers’ financial reporting quality. 
 1 
1. Introduction 
 
 A central premise of financial intermediation is that creditors serve an important 
corporate governance role by monitoring borrowers. Smith and Warner (1979) (among 
others) suggest that financial covenants are one important contract feature creditors use to 
influence borrowers’ behavior. Research has shown that accounting-based covenant use 
in public debt has declined dramatically over the last three decades.
1
 The decline in 
accounting-based covenants in public debt raises questions about whether public debt 
holders still serve an important monitoring role, and if so, whether outputs from the 
borrower’s accounting system are important in the monitoring function. 
We investigate the public debt holders’ monitoring role, by focusing on their 
decision to delegate monitoring to “credible” specialists.  The finance literature has long 
recognized when borrowers have multiple classes of lenders, the benefits of monitoring 
may be reduced by either free rider problems or duplication of monitoring efforts 
(Diamond, 1984). Delegating monitoring to “credible specialists” can mitigate these 
problems and reduce monitoring costs (Fama, 1990); however, the delegated monitor’s 
incentives to shift wealth from other claimants can be costly. For example, Bulow and 
Shoven (1978) suggest that when there are conflicts-of-interests among multiple classes 
of claimants, delegating monitoring may lead to inappropriate liquidation decisions. We 
focus on the use of cross-acceleration provisions in the public debt market to provide 
evidence on the costs and benefits of delegated monitoring generally, and specifically to 
enhance our understanding of the role of accounting in public debt contracting. 
By requiring accelerated debt repayment when any other debt payment is 
accelerated, cross-acceleration covenants allow one class of lenders to delegate 
                                                 
1
 Begley and Freedman (2004) report that after the 1990’s public debt rarely includes financial covenants. 
 2 
monitoring to credible specialists without jeopardizing their repayment priority. Based on 
prior research (e.g., Diamond, 1991, and Rajan, 1992), we argue that one reason public 
debt holders use cross-acceleration provisions to delegate monitoring to banks is because 
public debt holdings are less concentrated and hence more costly to renegotiate. 
Furthermore, bank debt typically has financial covenants allowing either accelerated 
payments or requiring borrowers to take actions to preserve lenders’ claims when 
borrowers’ performance deteriorates.  
We first examine what determines the use of cross-acceleration provisions in 
public debt contracts. Cross-acceleration provisions can affect the value of the borrower’s 
combined debt claims by increasing the likelihood of borrower liquidation due to 
cascading defaults. Liquidation can be either value increasing or reducing, depending on 
the liquidation and continuation value of the borrower on the liquidation date. We expect 
cross-acceleration provisions to be less likely when they are more likely to induce value-
reducing cascading defaults.
2
 Thus, we hypothesize that public debt contracts are less 
likely to include cross-acceleration provisions when the ratio of the borrower’s expected 
continuation to expected liquidation value is high. Cross acceleration provisions are also 
more likely when credit risk is high, since the expected value of total debt claims in 
liquidation relative to their continuation value will be increasing with credit risk.
3
 
Cross-acceleration provisions also can affect the distribution of claims among 
creditors. We predict that when conflicts of interest among banks and other claimants are 
                                                 
2
 Although less extreme than cross-default provisions triggered by any default event including technical 
covenant violations, cross-acceleration provisions increase the risk that cascading defaults lead to 
liquidation when borrowers’ liquidation values are substantially lower than their values in place.  Unlike 
cross-default provisions, cross-acceleration covenants allow borrowers to either cure or obtain waivers for 
their technical defaults without triggering public debt repayment. 
3
 Our numerical example in appendix A demonstrates the relation between credit risk and cross-
acceleration use. 
 3 
greater, the likelihood that public debt contracts include cross-acceleration provisions 
increases. We predict that the likelihood of conflicts between different lender classes will 
depend on the timing of required debt repayments and the going concern value of the 
borrower. More specifically, without cross-acceleration provisions, deterioration in the 
borrower’s credit quality encourages banks to accelerate their payments ahead of those of 
public debt holders regardless of borrower’s  going concern versus liquidation value.  The 
presence of a cross-acceleration provision can alter that incentive.  When the public debt 
contains a cross-acceleration provision banks will still find acceleration advantageous 
when the borrower’s going concern value relative to liquidation value is low, but for 
higher going concern to liquidation ratios  banks’ incentives to accelerate  payments will 
decrease with the amount of public debt due after the bank debt matures. The payment 
acceleration incentive is mitigated under these circumstances because the bank’s claims 
will be diluted if they accelerate payments.  
We also hypothesize that public debt will be more likely to include cross-
acceleration provisions when banks are relatively more capable monitors and have 
greater incentives to exert effort. We argue that banks are more likely to be “credible 
specialists” with incentives to monitor when they hold a larger proportion of the 
borrower’s debt, and when information asymmetries are large. We also argue that the 
monitoring benefits of banks’ access to proprietary information will be inversely related 
to the borrower’s financial reporting quality. We therefore expect cross-acceleration 
provisions will be more common for borrowers with lower accounting quality. 
We next investigate whether cross-acceleration provisions affect the public debt 
interest rate.  The effect of cross-acceleration provisions on interest rates will depend on 
several factors, including the costs of cascading defaults, the benefits of avoiding being 
 4 
disadvantaged through wealth transfers, and the benefits associated with avoiding 
duplicate monitoring. In addition, by including cross-acceleration provisions in the debt 
contract, public debt holders rely more on banks’ monitoring, and the actions that they 
take if the borrower defaults. Thus, the benefits of cross-acceleration also depend on 
banks receipt of timely and accurate default signals. Finally, we also extend Bharath et 
al.’s (2008) finding that accounting quality affects public debt interest rates by examining 
whether this effect differs for debt with versus without a cross-acceleration provision. 
To test our hypotheses, we identify 1,670 public debt issues (of 515 firms) with 
contract terms available in machine-readable format on the FISD database. Specifically, 
we require information on whether the contract includes a cross-acceleration provision, 
and for the interest rate analysis, we also require data on the spread charged in the 
contract.
4
 Given that cross-acceleration provisions are not uniformly beneficial, it is not 
surprising that cross-acceleration provisions are not ubiquitous.  We find that roughly 
62% of the sample public debt issues have cross-acceleration provisions.  
Our results are consistent with our hypotheses. Specifically, we find that cross-
acceleration provisions are less likely when the expected value of the borrower as a going 
concern is higher relative to its expected liquidation value, consistent with concerns that 
cross-acceleration covenants may cause sub-optimal liquidation. This effect is mitigated 
as the amount of debt due after the typical maturity of the bank debt increases. We also 
find that cross-acceleration provisions are less likely when the borrower has higher credit 
risk (i.e., smaller size and worse credit rating). These results support our hypothesis that 
cross-acceleration provisions help align lenders’ interests.   
                                                 
4
 We test our bank monitoring quality hypothesis using sample firms with lender ownership information 
from a syndicated loan obtained within 6 years before  public debt issuance. We collect bank loan data 
from the LPC Dealscan database. 
 5 
We further find that cross-acceleration provisions are more prevalent in public 
debt contracts when lead banks have stronger incentives to monitor.  Specifically, we find 
that public debt is more likely to include cross-acceleration provisions when the lead 
lender holds a relatively larger or more concentrated share of the borrower’s outstanding 
loans at the time of the public debt issuance.
5
 In addition, we find that the use of cross-
acceleration provisions increases with the number of financial covenants used in bank 
loans.
6
 These findings suggest that cross-acceleration provisions are more common when 
delegated monitors have greater incentives to be a “credible specialist.” We also find 
greater use of cross-acceleration provision for borrowers with higher absolute value of 
discretionary accruals and thus larger information asymmetry problems.  
We also document that the treasury spread charged on public debt agreements 
containing this provision is 62 basis points lower than public debt without the provision 
estimated using a Heckman model. The magnitude of our results is economically 
significant given an average sample spread of 156 basis points over the treasury rate. This 
result suggests that on average the expected value of the public debt claim is higher when 
the public debt includes a cross-acceleration provision. We further find that the presence 
of a cross-acceleration provision creates a positive association between the public debt 
interest rate and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. This finding suggests that 
accounting information affects the design of the public debt contract when it includes 
cross-acceleration provisions delegating monitoring to banks, which rely heavily on 
accounting-based covenants in monitoring firms.  
                                                 
5
 We measure the concentration ratio and lenders’ ownership in a bank loan at inception. Noise in this 
proxy may be induced by subsequent banks actions taken to change their exposure to the borrower that are 
not captured by the LPC database or in other publically available sources.  
6
We find a positive association between loan covenant and cross-acceleration provision use after 
controlling for endogeneity of banks’ monitoring incentives.  
 6 
Our paper extends the cross-monitoring literature by explicitly considering factors 
influencing cross-acceleration covenant use. Both Booth (1992) and Datta et al. (1999) 
focus on whether one type of lender benefits from the existence of other lender types. 
Neither explores the explicit mechanism through which cross-monitoring benefits 
lenders. More importantly, neither considers potential agency costs arising from multiple 
lenders and cross-monitoring.  We address these issues by providing evidence that public 
debt holders use cross-acceleration covenants to explicitly delegate monitoring to banks, 
and that cost-benefit tradeoffs induce cross-sectional variation in the demand for 
delegated monitoring.  
We also contribute to the debt covenant and financial reporting quality literatures. 
Our finding that accounting information affects inclusion of cross-acceleration provisions 
in public debt contracts, suggests that accounting is important in monitoring borrowers 
even after the elimination of financial covenants from public debt contracts. For public 
debt with cross-acceleration provisions, accounting still plays an important, although 
delegated, monitoring role. Our finding that accounting quality impacts the public debt 
interest rate only in the presence of a cross-acceleration provision suggests that 
accounting information is priced in indentures because of banks’ use of accounting-based 
covenants. This finding also extends the results in Bharath et al. (2008) who find that 
accounting quality affects public debt interest rates on average, but does not affect other 
terms of the public debt contract (like maturity or collateral). This suggests that 
accounting has a relatively more nuanced role in the public debt contract. When 
accounting quality is poor, public debt contracts are more likely to both include cross-
acceleration provisions and to charge the borrower a premium.  
 7 
             The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background for 
our study. We develop our hypothesis in Section 3.  We describe our sample in Section 4 
and our research design in Section 5. We present our empirical results and supplementary 
analysis in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7. 
2.      Background and Motivation 
 
2.1 Cross-Default versus Cross-Acceleration Covenants and Delegated Monitoring 
 Smith and Warner (1979) indicate that financial covenants are an important 
mechanism used by lenders to monitor borrowers. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) extend 
these arguments by highlighting that inclusion of financial covenants in debt contracts 
provides managers with incentives to make accounting choices to avoid covenant 
violations.  They also suggest that lenders rationally anticipate the use of this discretion 
and price-protect themselves.  Building on this research, Bharath et al. (2008) find that 
firms have poor accounting quality pay higher rates on both bank loans and public debt.  
 However, recent studies by Begley and Chamberlain (2005) and Begley and 
Freedmen (2004) indicate the declining use of financial covenants in public debt. 
Diamond (1991) and Rajan (1992) both suggest that covenant use by banks is likely more 
prevalent because their contracts are relatively less costly to renegotiate than public debt 
contracts. Public bonds are often diffusely held making renegotiation more difficult, 
especially since renegotiation of public debt typically requires agreement of two thirds of 
the bondholders. Consistent with their arguments, Begley and Freedman (2004) find that 
less than 5% of the public debt agreements contain financial covenants for their sample of 
1990’s bond contracts.  This questions the usefulness of firms’ accounting system in 
public debt holders’ monitoring role. In this paper, we suggest that some public debt 
holders delegate their monitoring decisions through the use of cross-acceleration 
 8 
covenants, and that these covenants provide for a more nuanced role of the firm’s 
accounting system in the monitoring of the borrower. 
 More specifically, lenders often explicitly include either cross-default or cross-
acceleration covenants in debt contracts. Although these two covenants are often loosely 
defined or used interchangeably (Taylor and Saneson, 2006), there is a fundamental 
difference between them. Specifically, cross-default provisions are triggered by any event 
of default including technical covenant violation, while cross-acceleration provisions are 
only triggered when the monitor demands early repayment. This difference has important 
implications for the use of these two covenants. 
   For example, when Amkor Inc failed to file its financial statements in a timely 
manner it resulted in a technical default on at least one tranche of their public debt. 
Bondholders within this tranche used this technical default to declare an event of default 
and demand acceleration of payments if the default was not cured in 60 days. Other debt 
with cross-default provisions could have used the technical default to also demand 
repayment. In contrast, bondholders with cross-acceleration covenants could only force 
payment acceleration if debt repayment was accelerated due to the technical default. 
Thus, unlike lenders with cross-default provisions, lenders with cross-acceleration 
provisions could only demand repayment if Amkor failed to cure the default and were 
forced to repay the debt early.   
 The practitioner literature suggests that the distinction between cross-acceleration 
and cross-default is particularly important when the borrower has debt with varying 
seniority. For example, Widen (2002) suggests that to secure their position at 
renegotiation without interference from subordinated-debt holders (public debt in our 
case), senior-debt holders (banks in our case) usually impose more restrictive covenants 
 9 
on the borrower than do subordinated-debt holders.
7
 In addition, she also suggests that 
senior debt (banks) should also cross default to other significant indebtedness of the 
debtor, particularly to the subordinated debt, to ensure that banks are included in any 
workout negotiations. That is, if there is a default (technical or otherwise) the bank uses 
the cross-default provision as a mechanism to investigate the circumstances surrounding 
the default, and either accelerate payments or change other contract provisions in 
response to the default. She suggests that, subordinated debt should be allowed to include 
a cross-acceleration provision. In doing so, subordinate debt holders do not take part in 
the renegotiation after defaults, but their interests can be protected if senior-debt holders 
decide to accelerate the payments.    
Consistent with Widen’s (2002) arguments, we find that cross-acceleration 
provisions are often found in public debt contracts.
8
 Of the 5,910 public debt agreements 
on the FISD database with covenant data, roughly 60% include cross-acceleration 
provisions. In contrast, cross-default provisions are observed in less than 4% of the public 
debt agreements covered on the FISD database (less than 2% in our sample).
9
 Since 
cross-default provisions are rare in public debt contracts, our study focuses on cross-
acceleration provisions.  
 Banks access to borrowers’ private information provides them with a comparative 
advantage when monitoring borrowers. In addition, banks complex relationships with 
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 A widely accepted premise in the academic literature is that bank debt is senior to public debt (Longhofer 
and Santo, 2003). Bank debt has more restrictive covenants and includes stricter cross-default covenants 
than indenture agreements. Paris (2000) finds observations consistent with these predictions in practice. 
8
 We hand collected a subsample of 40 bank debt contracts and found they almost always contained cross-
default provisions, and none contained cross-acceleration provisions. 
9
 Since our sample spans several years we examined the whether there was any inter-temporal variation in 
the use of cross-acceleration provisions.  We found no clear inter temporal pattern.  Peak usage occurs in 
1996 and 2005, with the least usage in 2003.  There is a lot of variation across years (2003 had a low of 
43% while 2005 had a high of almost 70%).  
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corporate borrowers involving other banking services provides economies of scope. For 
these reasons, banks are unlikely to delegate monitoring to other lenders; instead, they 
prefer to engage in their own monitoring. Although these broad banking services generate 
specialized knowledge about borrowers' financial condition, they may also affect banks 
incentives to demand loan acceleration if the  fees generated by these services would be 
affected.  This suggests that there is likely to be cross-sectional variation in banks’ 
monitoring incentives.  Banks may shirk in monitoring, especially if they do not have a 
strong reputation for providing high quality monitoring or if they receive substantial fees 
for providing non-banking services. 
2.2 Cross-Acceleration Covenants and Conflicts of Interests among Classes of Claimants 
 Bulow and Shoven (1978) develop a model and use numerical examples to suggest 
that lenders’ decisions to continue or liquidate a borrower may not maximize total value 
when multiple classes of claimants have conflicting interests with respect to their claims 
on assets and income flows. We extend this analysis by showing that cross-acceleration 
covenants can potentially align the interests of the classes of lenders. By stipulating that 
debt repayment must be accelerated when the payment on any other debt is accelerated, 
cross-acceleration provisions make the claims of all lenders due at the same time, 
increasing the chances that the borrower is liquidated. For a borrower with a liquidation 
value that exceeds its going concern value, the cross-acceleration provision prevents 
wealth shifting from other lenders to the delegated monitor and increases the total value. 
In Example 1 of Panel A of Appendix A we provide extended versions of the Bulow and 
Shoven (1978) examples that illustrate this possibility.  
 In contrast, cross-acceleration provisions could lead to an inefficient liquidation of 
a borrower if a cascading default is triggered and the borrower is worth more as a going 
 11 
concern (than in liquidation).
10
  For example, The Report of the Bank of England Task 
Force on Major Operational Disruption in the Financial System states that: 
The Task Force has also found that there may be potential problems with the use of cross-
default clauses where there is a risk that a default under one contract could trigger a 
cascade of defaults under many other contracts. … The Task Force believes that parties 
to contracts should consider carefully the limitation of the operation of cross-default and 
cross-acceleration provisions …The potential risk of cascades of defaults could be 
addressed through suitable defence provisions, including: 
   use of a narrow definition of the types of default capable of triggering 
cross-default provisions; 
   use of thresholds;  
   and use of grace periods. 
 
If the value of the borrower remaining in business is greater than its liquidation value, 
then cascading defaults that force liquidation are costly to all claimants (including 
lenders), especially if the liquidation value of the assets does not exceed the face value of 
the debt that must be repaid (see Example 3 of Panel A of Appendix A).  
 Recognizing the potential for triggering cascading defaults, the existence of a cross-
acceleration covenant could reduce the monitor’s incentives to demand early repayment, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of borrower liquidation (see Panel C of Appendix A). 
This increases total value if the borrower’s liquidation value is lower than its going 
concern value. 
2.3 Delegated Monitoring –Empirical Literature Review 
 Previous empirical research focusing on cross monitoring by lenders includes 
Booth (1992) and Datta et al. (1999). Both of these papers consider how interest rates are 
affected by the presence of another type of lender. Booth (1992) examines how past 
public debt issues affect the rates charged on bank loans while Datta et al. (1999) 
examine how the existence of a banking relationship affects the rate charged on initial 
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 Brigham and Ehrhardt (2008) describe this “common pool problem” as the incentive for each individual 
creditor to “foreclose on the firm even though it is worth more as an ongoing concern.” 
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public debt offerings. Both papers find that the presence of another lender results in a 
reduced rate on the newly issued debt. This cross-monitoring literature tests whether the 
implicit contract between different classes of lenders improves firms’ credit quality and 
benefits other lenders. We extend this literature by examining an explicit cross-
monitoring mechanism (i.e., cross-acceleration provision) that allows public debt holders 
to directly benefit from the monitoring performed by banks and by investigating the 
costs, not just the benefits, of having such cross-monitoring mechanism. 
3.  Hypothesis Development 
 
The existence of a cross-acceleration provision can affect the value of the combined 
debt claims on the borrower by increasing the likelihood of cascading defaults that result 
in the borrower’s liquidation. When borrowers are worth more in liquidation than as a 
going concern, cross-acceleration provisions can potentially result in value increasing 
liquidation.  That is, when a firm with a low ratio of going concern to liquidation value  
defaults on their bank debt, the cascading defaults associated with cross-acceleration 
provisions will likely result in a value increasing liquidation (see Ex. 1 in Panel A of 
Appendix A).  
For borrowers with a going concern value in excess of their liquidation value, the 
cascading defaults that can result from cross-acceleration provisions can result in a value 
decreasing liquidation.  That is, if it is in the bank’s best interest to demand early 
repayment despite the decrease in overall borrower value that results from liquidating a 
firm with a higher going concern value, then the cross-accelerating provision increases 
the costs associated with technical default of their financial covenants. (See Ex. 3 of 
Panel A of Appendix A). 
 13 
  Even in the absence of a differential between the expected liquidation and going 
concern value, the relative benefit of liquidation caused by cross-acceleration provisions 
will differ for public debt holders based on the risk associated with the borrower’s going 
concern value, since the value of upside potential is shared with equity holders. (See 
Panel B of Appendix A).  
We expect the benefit of cross-acceleration provisions at the time of the public 
debt issuance to be greater when the borrower’s expected liquidation value is likely to 
exceed its expected going concern value. We further predict that cross-acceleration 
provisions in public debt contracts to be more likely when the borrower’s downside risk 
is greater. Based on these arguments our first hypothesis is: 
H1: Public debt indenture agreements are less likely to include cross-acceleration 
provisions when the likelihood and cost of cascading defaults is higher.  
 
In addition to altering the value of the combined debt claims, cross-acceleration 
provisions can also affect the distribution of claims among creditors. We predict that 
when there are greater conflicts of interest among banks and other claimants, the 
likelihood that public debt contracts include cross-acceleration provisions increases. We 
also predict that the likelihood of conflicts between different classes of lenders will vary 
with the timing of required debt repayments for certain borrowers depending on their 
going concern to liquidation value. Specifically, without cross-acceleration provisions, in 
the event of default, banks will have an incentive to accelerate their payments ahead of 
those of public debt holders regardless of the borrower’s going concern versus liquidation 
value, thereby reducing public debtholders’ interests when liquidation value is relatively 
low.  The existence of a cross-acceleration provision can alter that incentive and align 
banks’ and public debtholders’ interests. (See Panel C of Appendix A.) Although this 
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incentive will still exist when the borrower’s going concern to liquidation value is low, 
for higher going concern to liquidation values, the bank’s incentives to accelerate its 
payments will be decreasing in the amount of public debt due after the bank debt matures 
in the presence of a cross-acceleration provision\ because the bank’s claims will be 
diluted if they accelerate payments.  
 Based on these arguments, we expect the creditor coordination benefits of cross-
acceleration provisions to be greater when a greater proportion of the total debt is due 
after the maturity of the bank debt for borrowers with higher going concern to liquidation 
values.  Thus our second hypothesis is: 
H2: Public debt indenture agreements are more likely to include cross-acceleration 
provisions when the conflicts of interests between classes of lenders are greater. 
 
We also expect that the benefits of cross-acceleration provisions to public debt to 
increase with the efficacy of delegated monitoring. These benefits are the greatest when 
the delegated monitor is more efficient (or effective) at monitoring and has incentives to 
provide high quality monitoring. Although banks’ superior access to private information 
and lower renegotiation costs provide banks a comparative advantage  when monitoring 
borrowers relative to public debt holders, there is likely to be cross-sectional variation in 
banks’ monitoring incentives.  Banks may shirk in monitoring, especially if they do not 
have a strong reputation for providing high quality monitoring or if the lending banks 
also charge substantial fees for providing non-banking services.   
 We argue that the public debt holder’s benefits from cross-acceleration 
provisions will be larger when the delegated lender has stronger incentives to provide 
higher quality monitoring. If banks utilize timely and accurate signals of deterioration in 
credit quality then delegated monitoring provides a lower-cost monitoring alternative for 
 15 
the public debt holders than direct monitoring. However, if the bank shirks as a monitor, 
or does not exert sufficient effort to correctly classify the borrower’s type, then delegated 
monitoring can increase both the public debt holders’ and the borrower’s losses. More 
specifically, if the bank acts either too quickly (e.g., triggering unnecessary cascading 
defaults) or not quickly enough in default decisions then the benefits of relying on 
delegated monitoring are likely to be low. To isolate banks’ incentives to provide higher 
quality monitoring we follow the estimation technique used by Ivashina (2009), which 
we discuss in detail in the research section. We also expect that banks are likely to be 
more effective monitors when the borrower’s performance is more difficult to measure at 
inception or over the life of the debt issuances. Banks have access to private information 
that they can use at contract inception and over the life of the contract to develop a better 
understanding of the firm’s credit quality.  Based on these arguments, our third 
hypothesis is: 
 
H3: Public debt indenture agreements are more likely to include cross-acceleration 
provisions when bondholders benefit more from banks’ monitoring actions. 
  
Based on these costs and benefits, the interest rate charged on public debt that 
includes cross-acceleration provisions could be either higher or lower than that on public 
debt without these covenants. Even though public debt holders can save monitoring costs 
by relying on bank’s monitoring using cross-acceleration provisions, there are conditions 
where the cross-acceleration provisions allow banks to shift wealth from bondholders and 
shareholders to themselves. In addition, even though in some cases cross-acceleration 
provisions may reduce the monitors’ ability to shift wealth from public debt holders to 
themselves, this does not necessarily imply that cross-acceleration provisions increase the 
 16 
expected pay-off on the public debt (see Ex. 3 of Panel A of Appendix A). As a result, 
the value of the public debt can be either higher or lower in the presence of cross-
acceleration provisions because the provisions can alter the likelihood that the borrower 
is liquidated or continued in circumstances where it is (or is not) value maximizing.  
 
H4:  The interest rate spread charged on public debt with cross-acceleration 
provisions differs from that charged on public debt without this provision. 
 
Bharath et al. (2008) provide evidence that public debt holders price-protect 
themselves, charging firms with lower accounting quality a higher interest rate., We 
expect public debt with a cross-acceleration provision to be more likely to include price 
protection against poor accounting quality since public debt seldom has financial 
covenants but banks rely on accounting-based covenants to monitor borrowers. That is, 
for a public debt agreement with a cross-acceleration provision the importance of 
accounting quality should be enhanced due to the use of financial covenants in the bank 
debt and the acceleration of payment that can result from a covenant violation.  Thus 
firms with poor accounting quality should suffer from greater price protection due to 
banks’ usage of accounting information when there are cross-acceleration provisions.  
This leads to our fifth and final hypothesis.   
 
H5:   The association between interest rate spreads and accounting quality is higher 
for public debt contracts with cross-acceleration provisions than those 
without. 
 
4.  Research Design   
 
 We conduct two analyses to test our hypotheses. In the first analysis, we 
investigate the determinants of the decision to include cross-acceleration provisions in 
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public debt agreements. In the second analysis we examine the effects of cross-
acceleration provisions on the interest spread charged in the public debt agreement. 
To test our hypotheses we focus on the characteristics of the borrower and their 
bank debt at the time that the public debt is issued.  There are two important assumptions 
implicit in this research design.  First, the bank debt holders may not stay constant over 
the life of the public debt, although we assume that the quality of the monitoring will 
remain constant. Second, the repayment schedule of the public debt and private debt 
affects the potential costs and benefits of cross-acceleration provisions, and the 
repayment schedule may change over the life of the public debt.  Similarly, we assume 
that the repayment schedule of the debt will be relatively constant over the life of the 
public debt. That is, firms refinance similar bank/public debt when the old debt matures 
to maintain a consistent repayment schedule.  
To test our first hypotheses that pubic debt is more likely to include cross-
acceleration provisions when the expected costs of cascading defaults are lower, we 
create a variable, PL Ratio, which measures the borrower’s expected going concern 
value scaled by its expected liquidation value.
11
 We measure the going concern value 
using the market value of total assets (total assets – book value of common equity – 
deferred tax + market value of common equity). We measure the liquidation value of 
assets in forced sales resulting from cascading defaults caused by cross-acceleration 
covenants by using Berger et al.’s (1996) estimate of asset tangibility: 0.715* accounts 
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 The value of the cross-acceleration provisions will depend on the relation between the liquidation value 
and expected going concern value at the technical default date. The decision to include the cross-
acceleration provisions in the public debt agreement will be based on EXPECTED values for these 
variables as of the contracting date.  We proxy for these expected values using the borrower’s liquidation 
value and going concern value at contract initiation, assuming that current values provide public debt 
holders with the best estimate of the value of these variables at the technical default date. We do not 
directly incorporate the variance of these values when estimating debtholders’ expected values for these 
implicit put options, although we do separately control  for the variance of these variables in our models. 
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receivable + 0.547* inventory + 0.535*PPE (Property, Plant and Equipment) + 1*cash. 
We use the tercile rank of this variable (PL Ratio_Rank) to reduce measurement error 
and to capture potential non-linearities in our model.
12
 We expect the use of cross-
acceleration covenants will be less likely when borrowers have higher PL Ratios based 
on H1. 
  We use three variables to test the effect of going concern risk on the decision to 
include cross-acceleration provisions in public debt contracts. Our first measure is the 
firms’ credit rating, SP Rate, which is a transformation of the S&P rating, from 1 (AAA) 
to 22 (D).
13
 Borrowers with worse credit ratings have more downside risk and we predict 
that they should be more likely to have cross-acceleration provisions. Our second 
variable is the standard deviation of returns, STD Ret, which is measured as the standard 
deviation of the residuals from the market model using daily returns of the year prior to 
the debt issuance. We require at least 100 observations of daily returns to be included in 
the market model. This measure captures both the upside and downside going concern 
risk. Our final measure is a measure of firm size, Size, which is calculated as the natural 
log of sales the year before they enter into the public debt agreement.  Larger borrowers 
are assumed to be less risky. Based on H1, we expect that cross-acceleration provisions 
are more beneficial to public debt holders and therefore are more likely to be used for 
smaller firms, more covenants, higher return volatility, or a worse credit rating, because 
these firms have higher downside risk.  
                                                 
12
 We find similar results when we dichotomize the PL Ratio,  use quintile ranks or use quartile ranks.. 
13
 We collect the S&P ratings from the FISD database because approximately 11% of public debt issuers 
lack data item 280 in COMPUSTAT at issuance. Ratings in FISD are issue specific and we employ the first 
S&P rating that incurs within 6 months of the issuance date for each public debt. In the rate cases where the 
S&P is not available, then we use Moody’s ratings instead (less than 3% of our sample). Public debt not 
rated by either S&P or Moody’s (54 debt issues, 3% of our sample) is removed from the sample.    
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        To test our second hypothesis that inclusion of cross-acceleration provisions 
increases with conflicts of interests between classes of lenders, we first examine whether 
the association between PL Ratio and the likelihood of cross-acceleration provisions 
depends on the repayment structure of the existing debt. To test this hypothesis, we 
measure the repayment structure of existing debt as the tercile rank of long-term debt 
(debt due in more than one year) plus the offering amount of the public debt issuance to 
total debt plus the offering amount of the new public debt (Repay_Rank). Based on H2, 
we expect the coefficient on PL Ratio_Rank interacted with Repay_Rank to be 
positive, while we do not have a prediction on Repay_Rank. 
We test our third hypothesis by examining whether the difficulty of measuring 
borrower performance and banks’ monitoring incentives are related to the likelihood of 
including cross-acceleration provisions in public debt indentures. If, as hypothesized, 
public debt indentures are more likely to include cross-acceleration provisions when 
bondholders benefit more from banks’ monitoring actions, then we expect a higher 
incidence of cross-acceleration use when borrower’s performance is more difficult to 
measure and when the bank’s incentives to monitor are greater. 
To test whether bondholders are more likely to employ this provision when it is 
more difficult to measure the borrower’s performance, we use a measure of accounting 
quality, developed by Bharath et al. (2008), to proxy for the borrower’s information 
environment. Dechow et al. (2010) suggest that there are a variety of problems associated 
with the use of existing accounting quality measures. Of these, the one problem most 
relevant to our study is that of construct validity.  More specifically, Dechow et al (2010) 
suggest that researchers should be concerned that the measures of accounting quality 
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employed in their paper capture the inherent difficulty associated with measuring 
borrower’s performance rather than a correlated variable, such as default risk. 
To address this concern we follow the factor analysis procedure used in Bharath 
et al. (2008). We define the variable Accruals as the first principal component of three 
commonly used metrics of accounting quality for each Fama/French industry 
classification. The detailed measurement of this variable is described in Appendix B. By 
using a principle component analysis, we identify a factor from three common measures 
of accounting quality, and thus reduce the noise associated with each individual measure.  
We also include measures of default risk in the model, to reduce the likelihood that our 
measure is actually measuring default risk.
14
  We assume that the performance of firms 
with higher discretionary accruals is more difficult to measure. Consistent with H3, we 
expect that public lenders of firms with more information asymmetry (i.e., high 
Accruals) to benefit from delegated monitoring.  
We test whether the quality and incentive of private lenders’ monitoring affects 
the likelihood of using cross-acceleration provisions using three different measures of 
lenders’ monitoring incentives. Our first two measures are based on the arguments in Sufi 
(2007) and Ivashina, (2009) that the share of the loan held by the lender deviates from the 
amount that would be dictated by diversification needs due to the lead lenders inability to 
commit to conducting proper due diligence and monitoring.  The first proxy is a lender 
Herfindahl index, Herf, which is calculated for each borrower. To construct this index, 
we calculate the Herfindahl index for each loan deal issued by the firm by summing up 
the squared ownership by each bank, scaled by 10,000.  We then define Herf as the 
                                                 
14
 While the principle component analysis reduces the likelihood that our accounting quality measure is 
simply an alternative default risk measure, it does not rule out this possibility, so the results should be 
interpreted with this caveat. 
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average of the Herfindahl index of these bank loans issued within six years before the 
issuance of the public debt. The second variable, Lead Share, is calculated as the 
average percentage of the loans held by the lead arrangers’ for all bank loans issued 
within six years before the issuance of the public debt.  Lead lenders with a relatively 
larger percentage of the loans are assumed to have stronger incentives to provide better 
monitoring (). Concentrated lenders are assumed to have stronger incentives to provide 
high quality monitoring.
15
 Finally, since banks’ monitoring incentive and intensity also 
manifest in the use of financial covenants in bank loans, we argue that the use of cross-
acceleration provisions increases with the number of financial covenants (Fin Cov) used 
in bank loans.   
In addition to our test variables, we also include other debt contract variables that 
could affect the decision to include a cross-acceleration provision in the public debt. We 
include Maturity, which is measured as the natural log of the maturity of the public debt 
obligation measured in months, to capture the effects of debt maturity that extend beyond 
the maturity of the existing bank loan contracts. We also allow for the possibility that the 
size of the public debt agreement will be related to the decision to use a cross-
acceleration provision. We measure the size of the indenture, Offer Size, as the natural 
log of the offering amount. We expect larger public debt issuances to be more likely to 
have cross-acceleration provisions. We also include the seniority of the public debt as a 
control variable. We use an indicator variable equal to 1 if the debt is senior, Senior, and 
zero otherwise. Finally, we include firm characteristics as control variables, e.g., 
Leverage (total debt/total assets), CFO (cash flow from operation/total assets),  PPE 
                                                 
15
 In addition to using the percentage of the loans held by lead arrangers, we also consider that banks’ 
incentives to monitor  increases with the ownership size (in dollars). Instead of adding a third proxy, we 
follow Ivashina’s (2009) approach by incorporating the size of investment as an instrumental variable.   
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(Property, Plant and Equipment/total assets), and the standard deviation of PL Ratio 
(STD PL Ratio)   
To estimate our model of the likelihood of inclusion of a cross-acceleration 
covenant we create an indicator variable, Crss_Accl, which is one if the public debt 
agreement has a cross-acceleration provision; zero otherwise. We then estimate the 
following Probit regression to examine the determinants of the decision to include this 
provision in the contract: 
Crss_Accl = β0 + β1*PL Ratio_Rank + β2*SP Rate + β3*STD Ret + β4*Size + β5* 
Repay_Rank  + β6*PL Ratio_Rank *Repay_Rank + β7*Accruals+ 
β8*Herf + β9*Fin Cov+ β10*Maturity + β11* Offer Size + β12*Senior + 
β13* Leverage + β14* CFO + β15* PPE 
  + β16 *STD PL Ratio+ ε                                                        (1) 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Crss_Accl:       An indicator variable that equals one if the public debt agreement 
includes a cross-acceleration provision, and zero otherwise. 
PL Ratio_Rank: The tercile rank of the ratio of firm’s value of continued operation to 
liquidation value, where value of continued operation is calculated as 
market value of total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6- #60- #74 + #25*  
#199) and liquidation value is calculated as 0.715* accounts receivable 
(COMPUSTAT item #2) + 0.547* inventory (COMPUSTAT item #3) 
+ 0.535*PPE (COMPUSTAT item #8) + cash (COMPUSTAT item 
#1);  
SP Rate:  Transformation of S&P rating, from 1 (AAA) to 22 (D); 
STD Ret:       The standard deviation of the residuals from the market model using 
daily returns from the year before the debt issuance, requiring at least 
100 observations in the firm-year; 
Size: The natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT item #12);  
Repay_Rank:   The tercile rank of the ratio of long-term debt (COMPUSTAT item #9) 
plus the offering amount of the bond issuance to total debt (long-term 
debt COMPUSTAT item #9 + current debt COMPUSTATE item #34) 
Accruals:  The first principal component of three various absolute values of 
discretionary accruals (described in Appendix B); 
Herf: To construct this index, we calculate Herfindahl index for each loan 
deal issued by the firm by summing up the squared ownership by each 
bank, scaled by 10,000.  We then define Herf as the median of the 
Herfindahl index of these bank loans issued within 6 years before the 
issuance of the public debt. 
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Fin Cov:        The median number of financial covenants of the loans issued within 6 
years before the issuance of the public debt. 
Maturity: The natural log of the loan’s maturity in months; 
Offer Size: The natural log of offering amount of the debt; 
Senior: Indicator variable equal to 1 if debt is senior, and zero otherwise;  
Leverage:       Total debt (COMPUSTAT item #9 + COMPUSTATE item #34) over 
total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6); 
PPE:            Property, plant and equipment (COMPUSTAT item #8) divided by 
total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6) 
CFO:  Cash flow from operation (COMPUSTAT item #308) divided by 
lagged total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6);  
STD PL Ratio:  The standard deviation of PL Ratio from the sample period. 
 
 
            To test our fourth and fifth hypotheses, we conduct a second analysis that 
examines the effect of cross-acceleration provisions on the interest rate spreads charged 
on public debt using the following OLS model:  
Treasury Spreads = β0 + β1*Crss_Accl + + β2* PL Ratio_rank+β3* SP Rate + β4* 
STD Ret +β5*Size β6*Accruals + β7*Crss_Accl* Accruals + β8* 
Maturity + β9* Offer Size + β10* Senior + β11* Leverage + β12* CFO + 
β13* PPE + β14* Credit Spread + β15* Term Spread + ε           (2)              
 
            In Equation (2), Treasury Spreads is defined by FISD as the interest charged on 
the indenture over the interest rates on a T-note with similar maturity.
16
 We argue that 
cross-acceleration provisions allow public debt holders to free ride on banks’ monitoring 
and therefore decrease the cost of debt. However, the interest charge of the public debt 
can also be higher in the presence of cross-acceleration provisions because banks can 
shift wealth from bondholders or because these provisions can alter the likelihood that the 
borrower is liquidated or continued in circumstances where it is not value maximizing. 
Therefore, we do not have a prediction on Crss_Accl. We also expect smaller firms, and 
firms with a lower CFO, higher return standard deviation, or a worse credit rating to have 
                                                 
16
 We confirmed with Mergent that Treasury Spreads are collected from the press release, for issues 
without this information on FISD but with offering yield information (i.e., 80 issues in the sample), we 
manually match offering yield with T-note with similar maturities to calculate treasury spreads. 
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a higher spread. In addition, we argue firms with more opaque information environment 
to pay a higher spread (Bharath et al., 2008), so we expect the coefficient on Accruals to 
be positive.  
We also expect the effect of Accruals on the interest rate to be different in the 
presence of cross-acceleration covenants. Based on H5, we expect the correlation 
between Accruals and interest charge to be larger in the presence of cross-acceleration 
provisions. Further we include Offer Size, Maturity, Senior, Fin Cov, PL Ratio_Rank 
Credit Spread and Term Spread as control variables, where Credit Spread is defined 
as the difference in yield between AAA and BAA corporate bonds, and Term Spread is 
defined as the difference in yield between 10-year and 2-year T-notes. 
            Given the likely endogenous determination of the decision to use cross-
acceleration provisions and interest rates, we employ a Heckman model to adjust for 
selection bias. Bradley and Roberts (2004) highlight the importance of adjusting this 
selection bias and use a similar approach to deal with the endogenous relation between 
bank debt interest spreads and covenants. Inverse mills ratios calculated from the first 
stage (i.e., Equation (1)) are then used in Equation (2) to adjust the selection bias. We 
follow Maddala’s (1983) approach to adjust the standard errors due to this two-stage 
procedure.     
5.  Sample Selection 
 
 To test our hypotheses, we require firms in our sample to have borrowed from the 
syndicated loan market within six years before they issue public debt. We collect public 
debt information from the FISD database, and bank loan information from the LPC 
database. We obtain detailed information on public debt agreements, including the 
covenants contained in those agreements, from the FISD database over the period from 
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June 1961 to February 2007.  We focus on public debt agreements entered into by U.S. 
corporations between January 1994 and February 2007 because our analyses require 
detailed data on the provisions included in the firm’s bank loans and bank loan data on 
the LPC database is only available over this period.   
We then merge the data from the FISD database with COMPUSTAT and CRSP 
and with the LPC Dealscan database of syndicated debt. In merging FISD and 
COMPUSTAT, we require a minimum of three months between fiscal year end and 
public debt issuances to ensure debt holders have current financial information. We also 
require each public debt to be rated by S&P or Moody’s (see footnote 13). We acquire 
ownership information of loan lenders from bank loans within five years before the 
public debt issuances. In our primary analysis, we include 1,670 public debt issues, of 
which 1,040 issues include a cross-acceleration provision.
17
 Our sample represents 540 
firms.
18
 Out of the 1,670 issues, 1,060 include the treasury spreads data on the FISD 
database, which is required for the cost of debt analysis.  
 
6 Results 
6.1 Main Analysis 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the firms in our sample partitioned by 
the presence of a cross-acceleration provision in the firm’s public debt. 1,040 out of 
1,670 (62%) of our public debt sample include this provision. Firms with cross-
acceleration provisions are smaller, have a larger returns variance, and have worse credit 
ratings.  This indicates that these firms are riskier, consistent with H1. We also find that, 
                                                 
17
 We exclude convertible bonds and private placements contained in the FISD database.  
18
 There are 5,910 issues that are neither private placements nor convertible bonds, representing 1,656 
firms, after merging with COMPUSTAT.  Requiring the firm to have issued bank debt within 6 years 
before debt with available lender information, there are 2,693 issues (776 firms). Finally, requiring all 
variables (including stock return volatility) to be non-missing, we end up having 1,670 issues (510 firms). 
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consistent with H3, firms using cross-acceleration provisions have larger absolute value 
of discretionary accruals. Also consistent with H3, firms with cross-acceleration 
provisions also appear to have a more concentrated group of lenders, with the lead lender 
holding a relatively larger share of the loan, and more financial covenants in bank loans.  
This suggests that firms with cross-acceleration provisions, on average, borrow from 
banks with higher monitoring incentives. In addition, public debt issues that contain this 
provision tend to be smaller. 
Table 2 presents the correlations of the variables in our models.  Both Size and SP 
Rate appear to be significantly correlated with several variables, although no correlation 
is greater than 50%.  Two of our measures of the quality of monitoring, the Herf and 
Lead Share, are 93% correlated, which is desirable since these are two alternative 
measures of the same construct.  
Table 3 presents the results of our tests examining the determinants of the choice 
to include cross-acceleration provisions in the firm’s public debt contract.  Consistent 
with H1 we find that the use of cross-acceleration provisions decreases with liquidation 
risk due to cascading defaults, we find a negative coefficient on PL Ratio_Rank. This 
finding suggests that when the borrower’s expected going concern value is high relative 
to its expected liquidation value of assets in place, the public debt contract is less likely to 
include cross-accelerations out of concerns that an avalanche of accelerations will lead to 
suboptimal liquidation or bankruptcy. Firms in the top tercile of PL Ratio are 17% less 
likely to include cross-acceleration provisions in public debt agreements than firms in the 
bottom tercile.
19
 Also consistent with our first hypothesis and with the Table 1 univariate 
                                                 
19
 The differential likelihood of using cross-acceleration provisions is based on the marginal effects from 
the Probit model. 
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statistics, the results of our Probit analysis indicate that riskier firms are more likely to 
include cross-acceleration provisions in their debt contracts.  In both models, we find that 
larger firms and firms with better credit ratings are less likely to have cross-acceleration 
provisions included in the contract. These results are both statistically and economically 
significant. For example, a one standard deviation increase in Size is associated with an 
8.7% decrease in the likelihood of including cross-acceleration provisions in public debt 
contracts.
20
 
Consistent with H2, we find a positive coefficient on PL Ratio_Rank* 
Repay_Rank, suggesting that while firms with high PL Ratio are less likely to use 
cross-acceleration covenants, later repayment of existing debt reduces the agency 
conflicts among lenders in the presence of cross-acceleration provision. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that the existence of a cross-acceleration covenant could 
reduce the monitor’s incentives to demand early repayment when doing so would 
substantially move forward the repayment of existing debt, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of borrower liquidation. 
To test our third hypothesis, Model 1 and 2 include Accruals to measure the 
bank’s ability to monitor and Lead Share and Herf, respectively, as our measure of 
incentives to monitor. Consistent with H3, we find that the higher the borrower’s 
unexplained accruals the more likely that the issue includes a cross-acceleration 
provision.  This suggests cross-acceleration covenants are more prevalent the more 
difficult it is to measure the borrowers’ performance. This result appears to be 
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 The standard deviation of Size is 1.531 and the coefficient of marginal effects is -0.057.   
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economically significant with a one standard deviation increase in Accruals leading to a 
4.8% increase in the likelihood of a cross-acceleration provision.
21
  
The estimated coefficients on our measures of the lender’s monitoring incentives 
are generally significant in the predicted direction supporting our hypotheses. When the 
bank loan ownership is more concentrated or when the lead arrangers hold a relatively 
larger share of the loan, the public debt agreement is more likely to include cross-
acceleration provisions. An increase in Herf (Lead_Share) by one standard deviation is 
associated with a 6.7% (8.2%) increase in the likelihood of having cross-acceleration 
provisions in public debt agreements.
22
 In sum, the results on Accruals, Lead Share and 
Herf suggest that the more beneficial delegated monitoring is, the more likely pubic 
debts include cross-acceleration provisions.  
Our finding that senior public debt is less likely to have cross-acceleration 
provisions than subordinated public debt is inconsistent with Widen’s (2002) argument 
that senior debt holders should be more likely to have cross-acceleration provisions.  The 
difference may be attributable to senior public debt holders not having superior rights, 
like banks.   
Table 4 reports the results on our second analysis, examining the effect of cross-
acceleration provisions on the treasury-spreads of the firm’s public debt agreements 
predicted by H4. In the OLS model, we find that cross-acceleration provisions increase 
interest spreads. In contrast, in the Heckman model, once we have controlled for 
differences in the type of borrower that includes this provision in their public debt 
contract, we find interest rates decrease with the existence of cross-acceleration 
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The standard deviation of Accruals is 0.336 and the coefficient of marginal effects is 0.143. 
22
 The standard deviations of Herf and Lead_Share of the overall sample are 0.191 and 20.708, 
respectively. The coefficients of marginal effects are 0.349 and 0.004, respectively.   
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provisions. The difference between the two models highlights the importance of 
controlling for the selection issue, as suggested by Bradley and Roberts (2004).  
In addition to this finding, in Table 4 we also find a positive coefficient on 
Crss_Accl*Accruals, which is consistent with H5 and suggests that accounting 
information is important to public debt holders because of their reliance on banks’ 
monitoring.
23
 Interestingly, for firms without cross-acceleration provisions, accruals do 
not appear to be related to the cost of debt. This result suggests that, compared to the 
results in the literature, accounting quality has a more nuanced role in public debt 
agreements.  When public debt holders rely on banks’ monitoring that typically has 
accounting based covenants, borrowers with poor accounting quality are charged a higher 
rate. In addition, this result suggests that our Accruals measure is not merely capturing 
risk, since risk should be related to the interest rate on the debtor even in the absence of a 
cross-acceleration provision. The estimated coefficients on our control variables indicate 
that interest rates decrease with Size, PPE and Senior, and increase with STD Ret.  All 
of these findings are consistent with our predictions. 
6.2 Robustness Checks   
            While loan ownership concentration and lead arrangers’ ownership can be a proxy 
for the quality of private lenders’ monitoring of the firm, it is possible that these two 
variables proxy for an omitted risk variable in the model. That is, our finding that 
concentrated ownership (or high lead lenders’ ownership) is associated with higher 
likelihood of inclusion of cross-acceleration provisions may be due to omitted variables. 
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 We also test whether the sum of the coefficients on main effect (β2 ) and interactive effect (β3 ) are 
different from zero.  The F-value of this test is 7.67, P-value is 0.0057, suggesting that accruals are priced 
when Crss_Accl=1. 
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Consistent with the suggestions of Larcker and Rusticus (2010) we use an instrumental 
variables approach with theoretically justified instruments to address this endogeneity 
issue. Besides using loan characteristics (e.g., loan maturity and deal size), we identify 
two additional theory based instruments.  
Consistent with Larcker and Rusticus’ (2010) suggestion, we identify our first 
instrument based on the theory that banks face regulatory lending restrictions that will 
potentially influence the amount of the loan that they will hold (see Ivashina, 2009). We 
argue that banks’ lending to a particular borrower is constrained by regulatory lending 
restrictions. In particular, loans to a single borrower cannot exceed 15% of a bank’s 
capital for uncollateralized loans or 25% for its collateralized loans. Following Ivashina 
(2009), for each lead lender, we rank their lending (in dollar amount) to various 
borrowers over the three years prior to the bank debt issuance. We then use the 75
th
 
percentile of the lending amount in dollars as a proxy for lending restrictions since these 
restrictions are not observable. Specifically, after we acquire this lending restriction 
proxy for each bank loan, we measure $Ownership as the median of this proxy for the 
bank loans issued within six years before the public debt is issued. We argue that the 
Lead Share and Herf increase with $Ownership, as the ownership by lead lenders 
depends on their capacity to lend to a single borrower.   
Our second theory based instrument arises from the introduction of market-flex 
language in bank loan contracts in 1998 that provided lead lenders with more flexibility 
when syndicating a loan (S&P, 2009). Specifically, prior to 1998 arrangers would 
informally polling select investors to gauge their interest and then launch the credit at a 
spread and fee believed to clear the market.  If the loan was undersubscribed, the 
arrangers could end up holding more of the loans than they would prefer. Market-flex 
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language,as a standard feature of loan commitment letters, .allows arrangers to change the 
pricing of the loan based on investor demand as well as shift amounts between various 
tranches of a loan, Therefore, we argue that after 1998, lead lenders’ ownership and 
ownership concentration decrease. The variable Market Flex is defined as the median of 
the indicator variable for whether a bank loan is syndicated after 1998 for bank loans 
issued within six years before the public debt is issued. 
The first stage regression results from the two-stage-least-squares model are 
presented in Table 5. Most importantly, we find that both Lead Share and Herf are 
positively correlated with $Ownership, and Herf is negatively correlated with Market 
Flex. All of these findings are consistent with our predictions. In addition, Herf and 
Lead Share are positively correlated with STD Ret. These findings are largely consistent 
with Sufi’s (2007) argument that the syndicated loans of firms with higher information 
asymmetry tend to have higher debt ownership concentration and higher ownership by 
lead arrangers. Further, we find Herf and Lead Share are negatively correlated with 
bank loan size and maturity.  Again, these results are consistent with Sufi’s (2007) 
findings. 
The results of the second stage of the 2SLS model are displayed in Table 6. Table 
6 shows that the results reported in Table 3 do not seem to be driven by the endogeneity 
issue. We continue to find that better monitoring quality is positively associated with the 
likelihood of using cross-acceleration provisions.   
           Finally, we define the variable Repay as 1-(total debt that mature within 3 years 
divided by total debt plus the offering amount of the new public debt), based on the idea 
that the average bank loan has a three-year maturity, to capture expected public debt 
repayments prior to bank loan maturity. We continue to find the same result that the 
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negative relationship between the use of cross-acceleration and going concern vs. 
liquidation value (i.e., PL Ratio_Rank) is dampened by Repay_Rank.   
 In an untabulated analysis, we investigate whether our measure of accounting 
quality is potentially capturing some correlated omitted variable by developing a measure 
of non-discretionary accruals, and investigating the relationship between non-
discretionary accruals and the use of cross-acceleration provisions.  Specifically, we 
identify the non-discretionary portion of accruals, and re-run the factor analysis on the 
non-discretionary portion of accruals.  Our reasoning behind this test is that if some 
correlated omitted variable is affecting discretionary accruals, it should also affect non-
discretionary accruals. So we then include this measure of non-discretionary accruals in 
the model, and find that it does not load in our tests.  This suggests our accounting quality 
measure is unlikely to be affected by correlated omitted variables. 
7.  Conclusion 
 
This paper extends the cross-monitoring literature by providing direct evidence on 
the determinants and consequences of public debt holders’ decision to delegate 
monitoring to private lenders, such as banks. Previous research considers only the benefit 
from the cross-monitoring mechanism that all public debt holders obtain because bank 
monitoring reduces the borrowers’ overall credit risk. Our paper suggests that cross-
monitoring is not always beneficial to bondholders who delegate monitoring to banks. 
Our results indicate that cross-monitoring may lead to value-reducing borrower 
liquidation and may give banks an opportunity to shift wealth from bondholders. In 
addition, rather than focusing on this implicit cross-monitoring effect, we consider 
explicit delegated monitoring included in some public debt issues that directly tie their 
payment schemes to banks’ monitoring. Specifically, we examine the covenant that 
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requires accelerated payment when banks decide not to waive technical defaults and 
instead demand accelerated payments.  
Based on the cost-benefit tradeoff, our paper shows that there is cross-sectional 
variation in the demand for cross monitoring. Specifically, we find that, for borrowers 
with higher expected going concern value relative to expected liquidation value, public 
debt issues are less likely to include a cross-acceleration provision. This suggests that 
cascading defaults are important in the decision to use cross-acceleration provision. We 
also find this relation is dampened when a larger amount of public debt matures before 
bank debt is due. In addition, we find that cross-acceleration provisions are more likely to 
be included in public debt agreements when the borrower has higher inherent risk and the 
benefits of creditor coordination are greater We also find that when the borrower’s 
performance is more difficult to measure the provision is more likely to be used. We 
further find that public debt agreements are more likely to include cross-acceleration 
provisions when borrowers’ delegated monitors have greater incentives to provide higher 
quality monitoring. As a consequence of this provision, we find that public debt issues 
that include this provision require a lower interest rate spread.  
Our paper also contributes to the debt covenant and accounting literatures. First, 
we highlight the mechanisms public debt holders use to delegate monitoring to banks. We 
find that not all public debt contracts use cross-acceleration provisions to delegate 
monitoring to banks.  Instead, public debt holders appear to consider the costs and 
benefits of delegating monitoring to banks.  One of the factors that appears to be 
relatively important in the decision to delegate monitoring is the quality of the borrower’s 
financial reports.  Public debt contracts of borrowers with low quality financial reports 
appear to be more likely to delegate monitoring to banks, and accounting quality appears 
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to affect the spreads offered in public debt contracts for the borrowers that have cross-
acceleration provisions.  These results also extend the results in Bharath et al. (2008) who 
find accounting quality affects public debt interest rates on average, but does not affect 
other terms of the public debt contract (like maturity or collateral). It appears that 
accounting has a relatively more nuanced role in  public debt. . 
We need to caveat the interpretation of our findings. First, due to data availability, 
our bank loan variables are measured at loan inception rather than at the public debt 
issuance date. To the extent that these variables change in the intervening period this will 
introduce measurement error to these bank loan variables. A related issue arises for the 
variables measured at public debt issuance, which we assume will stay constant over the 
life of the debt., For example, we assume that the debt repayment structure will not 
change through time. Again, this may induce measurement error in our proxies, which we 
attempt to address by ranking the effected variables.. We In addition, although we use an 
instrumental variable approach to deal with endogeneity concerns, the usual caveats 
concerning the validity of the instruments apply.  
 35 
Appendix A 
 
The following examples are constructed based on Bulow and Shoven (1978) who assume 
a firm has bank debt and public debt in a two-period game.  
 
In all examples, bank debt is due at the end of the second period and cash on hand 
exceeds or equals the payment on the bank loan plus the public debt due in the first 
period, but is less than the combined bank and public debt balance. This assumption is 
consistent with the borrower violating debt covenants in the bank debt during the first 
period allowing the bank to demand early repayment. Given these assumptions, the bank 
demanding early payment in the absence of a cross-acceleration provision will not force 
borrower liquidation, while the bank demanding early payment in the presence of a cross-
acceleration provision will force liquidation. The cases when these assumptions are not 
met are not considered in this appendix as they are less interesting for our purposes 
because the cross-acceleration provision will not alter the expected receipts. 
 
We examine how the value of the public debt changes based on differing continuation 
versus liquidation values, on differing amounts of public debt payments due prior to bank 
debt repayments, and on differing uncertainty in the expected value of continuation.  
 
All examples assume: 
(i) cash holdings (C) equal $405,  
(ii) the expected value of future earnings if the firm is continued (P) equals $135, 
(iii) the bank debt contractually due at the end of the second period (B) equals $135, 
(iv) the total public debt (D) equals $540, and 
(v) the absolute value of the uncertainty  in future earnings (G) multiplied by the 
probability of each state (P) equals  $100 (e.g., if P is 50% for both good and bad 
states, then G is $200.) 
 
To examine how the desirability of cross-acceleration provisions varies with continuation 
versus liquidation, we allow the liquidation value (L) to vary. To examine variation in 
banks’ incentives to require early payment, we allow the amount of the public debt due 
prior to the bank debt (D1) to vary. Finally, to examine variation in the value of 
liquidation induced by cross-acceleration provisions we consider differing uncertainty in 
the expected value of continuation (P and G). Where observable, we restrict our examples 
to values that are consistent with the empirical distribution of the data in our sample. 
Specifically, we use the values reported in table 1 for the PL ratio and for Repay to guide 
the values for L and for D1 that we consider in our examples. Since P and G are 
unobservable, our data cannot guide our choices for these variables. 
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The formula for calculating the expected receipts for bank and public debt are: 
 
Early Repayment with Liquidation (cross-acceleration) 
 
Bank   =  (C+L)*(B/(B+D) 
 
Public =  (C+L)*(D/(B+D) 
 
Early Repayment without Liquidation (no cross-acceleration) 
 
Bank  = B  
 
Public =D1+PUp*Min((D- D1),(C- D1-B+P+GUp))+PDown*Max(0, (C- D1-B+P-GDown)) 
 
No Early Repayment 
 
Bank =           PUP*Min(B,((C- D1+P+GUp)*(B/(B+D- D1))) 
+ PDown*Max(0, (C- D1+P-GDown)*(B/(B+D- D1)) 
 
Public = D1 + PUP Min((D- D1),((C- D1+P+GUp)*((D- D1)/(B+D- D1)))  
+ PDown*Max(0, (C- D1+P-GDown) )*((D- D1)/(B+D- D1) 
 
Panel A provides an analysis of how cross-acceleration provisions affect payouts to bank 
debt and public debt as the liquidation value changes, Panel B provides similar analysis 
as the payment date of the public debt changes.  Panel C demonstrates the role of changes 
in G, the uncertainty in value associated with continuation, which depends on both the 
value of an “upside” and “downside” outcome and the probabilities of these outcomes.  
While default risk is not explicitly modeled in Bulow and Shoven (1978) changes in G is 
the closest measure to default risk in their model. 
 
In Panel A, we observe that when there is no cross-acceleration provision, the bank 
demanding early repayment will never force liquidation so the bank will always demand 
early payment. This will result in a shift in expected receipts from the public debt holders 
to the bank debt holders, but will not change the expected firm value. 
 
When there is a cross-acceleration provision that could result in liquidation, the bank may 
not always demand early repayment depending on the relative continuation versus 
liquidation value. At the point where the bank’s share of the reduction in firm value from 
liquidation exceeds the benefit of shifting receipts from the public debt holders, the bank 
will no longer choose to demand early repayment. The benefit to public debtholders of 
using cross-acceleration provisions increase with L, which can be seen in the right most 
column in Panel A. 
 
In Panel B, if the bank demands early repayment resulting in liquidation the expected 
receipts do not depend on G. The dependence on G of the difference in expected receipts 
for cross-acceleration versus no cross-acceleration arises from the dependence of receipts 
of early repayment without liquidation. As long as the upside assets are sufficient to 
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insure that the debt is repaid in full in the up state (i.e. G exceeds D – C), the upside 
receipts will be equal to the remaining debt balance (i.e. D-D1. ) As long as the downside 
assets exceed zero (i.e. C-G exceeds D1 ) then the downside receipts will be the C-G- D1.  
Since D1 appears in both the up and down states, the negative effect of D1 in the second 
period will offset the positive effect in the first period so the expected payment will not 
depend on D1. By construction the value of G in the downstate will be -100. Therefore the 
difference in expected payout will depend on the relative size of the total public debt (D) 
to the beginning cash balance (C). Since the debt is repaid in full in the up state but is not 
repaid in the downstate (because C is less than D), the expected receipts will be lower the 
smaller is PUP.  
 
Although the intuition is somewhat more complicated, the finding of a monotonic decline 
in value of cross-acceleration provisions to public debt holders as the probability of the 
downside decreases also holds using the liquidation value of 25 from Panel B.  With this 
liquidation value the bank will always chose no early repayment. The public debt receipts 
with no early repayment will also decline with an increase in the downside probability, 
but the rate of decline with cross-acceleration is smaller than without, thus preserving the 
monotonic pattern reported in Panel B. 
 
To demonstrate that the repayment schedule matters in the decision to use cross-
acceleration provisions, we argue that if the bank demands early payment the difference 
in expected receipts for cross-acceleration versus no cross-acceleration does not depend 
on D1.  This is uniformly the case when early payment results in liquidation (in the 
presence of cross-acceleration provision)since the expected receipts formula does not 
depend on D1.  In addition, for early payment not resulting in liquidation (in the absence 
of cross-acceleration provision), the expected receipts will not depend on D1 as long as D1 
is less than C-G
24
 so that the receipts in the down state are greater than zero. This 
condition is consistent with the empirical repayment distribution in our sample. 
 
When the bank does not demand early repayment, the public debt receipts will depend on 
D1 since the first order effect of an increase in D1 will be a reduction in second period 
payments that is only a fraction of the increase in payment in the first period.  
 
The banks decision to require early repayment will depend on both the going concern to 
liquidation value of the borrower, as well as on the amount of public debt that will be 
repaid prior to the maturity of the bank debt if early repayment is not required. The 
examples in Panel C illustrate how the bank’s indifference point between early repayment 
and no early repayment varies with D1 as the liquidation value of the borrower changes. 
When liquidation is greater than going concern value (e.g. Ex 12 in Panel C), the bank 
always requires early repayment, and as discussed above, the benefits of using cross-
acceleration provisions do not vary with D1. In this scenario, the payoffs to public 
debtholders are also higher when the bank requires early repayment since the liquidation 
value is higher. On the other hand (e.g., Ex 1-11), the benefits of using cross-acceleration 
                                                 
24
 Strictly speaking, we should say as long as D1 is less than C-G+P-B, but since we assume that B and P 
are equal, we simplify the equation. The other condition that needs to be met is that D<C-B+P+G, which is 
assumed to be satisfied in all examples.  
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provisions vary with D1 as PL Ratio increases. In Ex 1-10, if D-D1 is higher than the 
specified level at a given PL Ratio, then the bank would not require early repayment 
since banks' interests are diluted when there is a cross-acceleration provision. In this 
scenario, cross-acceleration provisions align public debtholders and banks’ interests, 
reducing the likelihood of value-decreasing liquidation. On the other hand, if D-D1 is 
lower than the specified level at a given PL Ratio, banks prefer early repayments that 
reduce public debtholders’ payoffs in the presence of cross-acceleration provisions. 
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Panel A: Benefits of Cross-acceleration versus No Cross-Acceleration for varying values 
of L holding constant D1(Assumes G= 200 and PUp = PDown = 50%) 
 
Ex.   Early 
repayment 
No Cross-
Acceleration 
No 
liquidation  
Early 
repayment 
Cross-
Acceleration 
Liquidation 
 
No early 
repayment 
Difference  
Cross-
Acceleration 
versus No 
Cross- 
Acceleration 
1 L=210; D1 =150 
    Bank 
  {Public Debt} 
   (Firm Value) 
 
135 
{373} 
(540) 
 
123* 
{492}* 
(615)* 
 
92 
{416} 
(540) 
 
(12) 
119 
75 
2  L=135; D1 =150 
    Bank 
  {Public Debt} 
   (Firm Value) 
 
135 
{373} 
(540) 
 
108* 
{432}* 
(540)* 
 
92 
{416} 
(540) 
 
(27) 
59 
0 
3  L=60; D1 =150 
    Bank 
  {Public Debt} 
   (Firm Value) 
 
135 
{373} 
(540) 
 
93* 
{372} 
(465) 
 
92 
{416}* 
(540)* 
 
(42) 
(1) 
(75) 
*represents the preferred state assuming a cross-acceleration provision 
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Panel B: Benefits of Cross-acceleration versus No Cross-Acceleration for a mean 
preserving spread with varying values of PUp ,PDown , and G with an assumption of an 
expected uncertainty of continuation value of +100 and -100 for varying probabilities of 
up versus downside outcomes, for example in Ex1, Gup=500 and Gdown=125 (assuming, 
as in Ex. 2 of Panel A that that L=135 and D1 = 150).  
 
Ex.   Early repayment 
No Cross-
Acceleration 
No liquidation  
Early 
repayment 
Cross-
Acceleration 
Liquidation 
 
No early 
repayment 
Difference  
Cross-
Acceleration 
versus No 
Cross- 
Acceleration 
1 PUp=0.2 PDown=0.8  
Bank  
{Public Debt} 
(Firm Value) 
 
 
135 
{332} 
(540) 
 
108* 
{432}* 
(540) 
 
82 
{385} 
(540) 
 
(27) 
100 
0 
2 PUp=0.4 PDown=0.6 
Bank  
{Public Debt} 
(Firm Value) 
 
135 
{359} 
(540) 
108* 
{432}* 
(540)* 
89 
{406} 
(540) 
(27) 
73 
0 
3  PUp=0.5 PDown=0.5  
Bank  
{Public Debt} 
( Firm Value) 
 
135 
{373} 
(540) 
108* 
{432}* 
(540)* 
92 
{416} 
(540) 
(27) 
59 
0 
4 PUp=0.6 PDown=0.4  
Bank  
{Public Debt} 
(Firm Value) 
 
135 
{386} 
(540) 
108* 
{432}* 
(540)* 
95 
{426} 
(540) 
(27) 
46 
0 
*represents the preferred state assuming a cross-acceleration provision 
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Panel C: How the bank’s indifference point between early repayment and no early 
repayment varies with  D1 as the liquidation value of the borrower changes. (Assumes G= 
200 and PUp = PDown = 50%)  
 
Ex. P/L Repay L D-D1 
1 6.75 0.59 20 317 
2 5.40 0.59 25 327 
3 4.50 0.62 30 336 
4 3.38 0.67 40 360 
5 2.70 0.70 50 379 
6 2.25 0.75 60 404 
7 1.92 0.80 70 430 
8 1.69 0.85 80 460 
9 1.50 0.91 90 493 
10 1.35 0.98 100 531 
11 1.00 1.00 135 540 
12 0.50 1.00 270 540 
*represents the preferred state assuming a cross-acceleration provision 
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 APPENDIX B 
Construction of the variable Accruals  
 
ABACC1: the absolute value of current discretionary accruals calculated based on Teoh 
et al. (1998). The model is estimated annually for each Fama/French (1997) 
industry group and each industry-year regression requires at least 20 observations. 
Based on Teoh et al. (1998) we first estimate the following regression to get the 
estimated coefficients (variables are defined below).  
 
          


LagTA
v
LagTALagTA
AcccCurrent Re1_
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The second step calculates the absolute value of discretionary accruals as: 
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ABACC2: the absolute value of total discretionary accruals calculated based on Dechow 
et al. (1995). The model is estimated annually for each Fama/French (1997) 
industry group and each industry-year regression requires at least 20 observations. 
We first estimate the following regression to get the estimated coefficients 
(variables are defined below).  
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The second step calculates the absolute value of discretionary accruals as: 
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ABACC3: the absolute value of total current accruals calculated based on Dechow and 
Dichev (2002). The model is estimated annually for each Fama/French (1997) 
industry group and each industry-year regression requires at least 20 observations. 
ABACC3 is the absolute value of the estimated residual from the following model.  
 
        v
LagTA
CFO
LagTA
CFO
LagTA
CFO
LagTA
AccCurrent
ttt   132110 )()()(
_
  
where 
 
Current_Acc = Earnings before extraordinary items – Cash flow from operating 
activities – Depreciation (COMPUSTAT #123 – #308 +  #14); 
Total_Acc      = Earnings before extraordinary items – Cash flow from operating 
activities (COMPUSTAT #123 – #308); 
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LagTA           = Lagged total assets (COMPUSTAT#6); 
CFO               = Cash flow from operating activities (COMPUSTAT #308); 
ΔRev               = Change in sales (COMPUTSTAT #12); 
ΔAR                = Change in accounts receivables (COMPUSTAT #2). 
PPE                = property, plant and equipment (COMPUSTAT #8).  
 
After the three accruals metrics are measured we then extract the first principal 
component from the three proxies by industry. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics by cross-acceleration provision 
 
Variable 
Public Debt Does not Contain 
Cross-Acceleration Provision 
Public Debt contains Cross-
Acceleration Provision 
 Mean 
(Median) 
Std Dev Mean 
(Median) 
Std Dev 
 
PL Ratio 
4.839 
(3.546) 
3.559 4.763 
(3.355) 
4.465 
 
PL Ratio_Rank 
1.027 
(1.000) 
0.859 0.984 
(1.000) 
0.790 
 
SP Rate 
8.008 
(8.000) 
2.994 10.266*** 
(10.000)*** 
3.497 
 
STD Ret 
0.020 
(0.018) 
0.008 0.023*** 
(0.021)*** 
0.011 
 
Size 
8.904 
(9.039) 
1.196 7.833*** 
(7.867)*** 
1.571 
 
Repay 
0.815 
(0.882) 
0.207 0.879*** 
(0.951)*** 
0.192 
 
Repay_Rank 
0.767 
(1.000) 
0.786 1.142*** 
(1.000)*** 
0.802 
 
 
Accruals 
-0.325 
(-0.366) 
0.225 -0.249*** 
(-0.357)* 
0.385 
 
Herf 
0.104 
(0.069) 
0.111 0.187*** 
(0.097)*** 
0.220 
 
Lead Share 
17.374 
(12.500) 
14.889 25.465*** 
(17.000)*** 
22.983 
 
Fin Cov 
1.027 
(1.000) 
0.948 1.552*** 
(1.500)*** 
1.479 
 
Maturity 
4.699 
(4.796) 
0.799 4.700 
(4.780) 
0.589 
 
Offer Size 
19.534 
(19.519) 
0.761 19.359*** 
(19.337)*** 
0.681 
 
Senior 
0.976 
(1.000) 
0.152 0.837*** 
(1.000)*** 
0.370 
 
Leverage 
0.357 
(0.338) 
0.167 0.380** 
(0.361)** 
0.201 
 
CFO 
0.098 
(0.096) 
0.070 0.110*** 
(0.095) 
0.091 
 
 
PPE 
0.402 
(0.393) 
0.254 0.396 
(0.417) 
0.272 
 
STD PL Ratio 
1.063 
(0.578) 
1.157 2.648** 
(0.707)*** 
15.774 
 
 
Number of Obs. 
630  1,040  
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Note: ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance of the differences 
between the mean (median) for the firms with cross-acceleration and the mean (median) 
for the firms without cross-acceleration provisions using a T-Test (Wilcoxon Signed rank 
test). 
 
Variable Definitions: 
PL Ratio:   Ratio of firm’s value of continued operation to liquidation value, where 
value of continued operation is calculated as market value of total assets 
(COMPUSTAT item #6- #60- #174+ #25* #199) and liquidation value is 
calculated as 0.715* accounts receivable (COMPUSTAT item #2) + 
0.547* inventory (COMPUSTAT item #3) + 0.535*PPE (COMPUSTAT 
item #8) + cash (COMPUSTAT item #1);  
PL Ratio_Rank:  Tercile ranking of PL Ratio. 
SP Rate:  Transformation of S&P rating, from 1 (AAA) to 22 (D); 
STD Ret:      The standard deviation of the residuals from the market model using daily 
returns from the year before the debt issuance, requiring at least 100 
observations in the firm-year; 
Size: the natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT item #12);  
Repay:       Measured as the ratio of long-term debt (COMPUSTAT item #9) plus the 
offering amount of the bond issuance to total debt ( long term debt 
COMPUSTAT item #9 + current debt #34) plus the offering amount of the 
bond; 
Repay_Rank: Tercile ranking of Repay. 
Accruals: The first principal component of three various absolute values of 
discretionary accruals (described in Appendix B); 
Herf: To construct this index, we calculate Herfindahl index for each loan deal 
issued by the firm by summing up the squared ownership by each bank, 
scaled by 10,000.  We then define Herf as the median of the Herfindahl 
index of these bank loans issued within 6 years before the issuance of the 
public debt; 
Lead Share:  The median percentage of the loan held by the lead arrangers’ for all of the 
bank loans issued within 6 years before the issuance of the public debt; 
Fin Cov:      The median number of financial covenants of the loans issued within 6 years 
before the issuance of the public debt; 
Maturity: The natural log of the loan’s maturity in months; 
Offer Size: The natural log of offering amount of the debt; 
Senior: Indicator variable equal to 1 if debt is senior, and zero otherwise;  
Leverage:      Total debt (COMPUSTAT item #9 + #34) over total assets (COMPUSTAT 
item #6); 
CFO:  Cash from operation (COMPUSTAT item #308) divided by lagged total 
assets (COMPUSTAT item #6);  
PPE:          Property, plant and equipment (COMPUSTAT item #8) divided by total 
assets (COMPUSTAT item #6); 
STD PL Ratio: The standard deviation of PL Ratio from the sample period. 
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Table 2 
Pearson correlation analysis (p-values in the parentheses) 
 
 PL 
Ratio 
SP Rate STD 
Ret 
Size Repay Accrual Herf Lead 
Share 
Fin Cov Mat Offer 
Size 
Senior Leverage CFO PPE STD 
PL  
 
Crss_Accl 
-0.009 
(0.718) 
0.312 
(0.001) 
0.149 
(0.001) 
-0.339 
(0.001) 
0.162 
(0.001) 
0.111 
(0.001) 
0.210 
(0.001) 
0.191 
(0.001) 
0.218 
(0.001) 
0.005 
(0.849) 
-0.117 
(0.001) 
-0.216 
(0.001) 
0.053 
(0.032) 
0.065 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.676) 
0.062 
(0.012) 
 
PL Ratio 
 -0.189 
(0.001) 
-0.099 
(0.001) 
-0.010 
(0.001) 
0.077 
(0.002) 
-0.117 
(0.001) 
-0.044 
(0.074) 
-0.039 
(0.113) 
0.095 
(0.001) 
-0.009 
(0.717) 
0.004 
(0.885) 
0.071 
(0.004) 
-0.079 
(0.001) 
0.189 
(0.001) 
-0.327 
(0.001) 
0.419 
(0.001) 
 
SP Rate 
  0.462 
(0.001) 
-0.619 
(0.001) 
0.409 
(0.001) 
0.175 
(0.001) 
0.343 
(0.001) 
0.305 
(0.001) 
0.428 
(0.001) 
-0.078 
(0.002) 
-0.215 
(0.001) 
-0.490 
(0.001) 
0.302 
(0.001) 
-0.087 
(0.001) 
0.214 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.905) 
 
STD Ret 
   -0.288 
(0.001) 
0.063 
(0.011) 
0.240 
(0.001) 
0.314 
(0.001) 
0.278 
(0.001) 
0.183 
(0.001) 
-0.137 
(0.001) 
-0.086 
(0.001) 
-0.185 
(0.001) 
0.237 
(0.001) 
-0.028 
(0.256) 
0.041 
(0.098) 
-0.063 
(0.009) 
 
Size 
    -0.328 
(0.001) 
-0.088 
(0.001) 
-0.399 
(0.001) 
-0.363 
(0.001) 
-0.354 
(0.001) 
-0.017 
(0.499) 
0.461 
(0.001) 
0.389 
(0.001) 
-0.203 
(0.001) 
-0.088 
(0.001) 
-0.138 
(0.001) 
-0.135 
(0.001) 
 
Repay 
     -0.043 
(0.079) 
0.097 
(0.001) 
0.037 
(0.130) 
0.277 
(0.001) 
0.130 
(0.001) 
-0.040 
(0.098) 
-0.160 
(0.001) 
-0.206 
(0.001) 
0.265 
(0.001) 
0.383 
(0.001) 
0.061 
(0.012) 
 
Accruals 
      0.171 
(0.001) 
0.155 
(0.001) 
-0.020 
(0.409) 
-0.016 
(0.516) 
-0.061 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.990) 
0.119 
(0.001) 
-0.089 
(0.001) 
-0.005 
(0.852) 
-0.051 
(0.036) 
 
Herf 
       0.926 
(0.001) 
0.013 
(0.599) 
-0.059 
(0.015) 
-0.250 
(0.001) 
-0.225 
(0.001) 
0.089 
(0.001) 
-0.009 
(0.688) 
-0.054 
(0.027) 
-0.017 
(0.480) 
 
Lead Share 
        0.045 
(0.063) 
-0.084 
(0.001) 
-0.218 
(0.001) 
-0.207 
(0.001) 
0.108 
(0.001) 
-0.020 
(0.412) 
-0.091 
(0.001) 
-0.07 
(0.790) 
 
Fin Cov 
         -0.018 
(0.465) 
-0.094 
(0.001) 
-0.229 
(0.001) 
0.049 
(0.046) 
0.007 
(0.762) 
-0.017 
(0.483) 
0.173 
(0.001) 
 
Maturity 
          -0.084 
(0.001) 
-0.035 
(0.156) 
-0.112 
(0.001) 
0.064 
(0.009) 
0.095 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.939) 
 
Offer Size 
           0.134 
(0.001) 
-0.101 
(0.001) 
0.081 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.921) 
-0.064 
(0.009) 
 
Senior 
            -0.112 
(0.001) 
-0.040 
(0.106) 
-0.056 
(0.021) 
0.027 
(0.271) 
 
Leverage 
             -0.214 
(0.001) 
0.034 
(0.165) 
-0.067 
(0.006) 
CFO               0.363 
(0.001) 
0.011 
(0.661) 
PPE                -0.139 
(0.001) 
 
Variable Definitions: 
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PL Ratio:   Ratio of firm’s value of continued operation to liquidation value, where value of continued operation is calculated as 
market value of total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6- #60- #174+ #25* #199) and liquidation value is calculated as 
0.715* accounts receivable (COMPUSTAT item #2) + 0.547* inventory (COMPUSTAT item #3) + 0.535*PPE 
(COMPUSTAT item #8) + cash (COMPUSTAT item #1);  
SP Rate:  Transformation of S&P rating, from 1 (AAA) to 22 (D); 
STD Ret:      The standard deviation of the residuals from the market model using daily returns from the year before the debt issuance, 
requiring at least 100 observations in the firm-year; 
Size: the natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT item #12);  
Repay:       Measured as the ratio of long-term debt (COMPUSTAT item #9) plus the offering amount of the bond issuance to total 
debt ( long term debt COMPUSTAT item #9 + current debt #34) plus the offering amount of the bond; 
Accruals: The first principal component of three various absolute values of discretionary accruals (described in Appendix B); 
Herf: To construct this index, we calculate Herfindahl index for each loan deal issued by the firm by summing up the squared 
ownership by each bank, scaled by 10,000.  We then define Herf as the median of the Herfindahl index of these bank 
loans issued within 6 years before the issuance of the public debt; 
Lead Share:  The median percentage of the loan held by the lead arrangers’ for all of the bank loans issued within 6 years before the 
issuance of the public debt; 
Fin Cov:      The median number of financial covenants of the loans issued within 6 years before the issuance of the public debt; 
Maturity: The natural log of the loan’s maturity in months; 
Offer Size: The natural log of offering amount of the debt; 
Senior: Indicator variable equal to 1 if debt is senior, and zero otherwise;  
Leverage:      Total debt (COMPUSTAT item #9 + #34) over total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6); 
CFO:  Cash from operation (COMPUSTAT item #308) divided by lagged total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6);  
PPE:          Property, plant and equipment (COMPUSTAT item #8) divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6); 
STD PL Ratio: The standard deviation of PL Ratio from the sample period. 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Determinants of the use of cross-acceleration provisions in public debt agreements 
 
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 
 Pred 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(Z-Stat) 
Coefficient 
(Z-Stat) 
 
Intercept 
 
? 
0.352 
(0.24) 
0.533 
(0.36) 
 
PL Ratio_Rank 
 
- 
-0.236 
(-2.02)** 
-0.231 
(-2.00)** 
 
SP Rate 
 
+ 
0.056 
(1.41)* 
0.060 
(1.51)* 
 
STD Ret 
 
+ 
-0.736 
(-0.12) 
0.161 
(0.03) 
 
Size 
 
- 
-0.158 
(-2.22)** 
-0.165 
(-2.28)** 
 
Repay_Rank 
 
? 
-0.032 
(-0.26) 
-0.026 
(-0.21) 
PL Ratio_Rank *  
Repay_Rank 
 
+ 
0.164 
(1.68)** 
0.167 
(1.71)** 
 
Accruals 
 
+ 
0.393 
(2.55)*** 
0.392 
(2.56)*** 
 
Herf 
 
+ 
0.956 
(2.39)** 
 
 
Lead Share 
 
+ 
 0.006 
(1.68)** 
 
Fin Cov 
 
+ 
0.080 
(1.17) 
0.065 
(0.96) 
 
Maturity 
 
+ 
0.021 
(0.36) 
0.022 
(0.37) 
 
Offer Size 
 
? 
0.061 
(0.71) 
0.053 
(0.61) 
 
Senior 
 
? 
-0.431 
(-2.03)** 
-0.435 
(-2.04)** 
 
Leverage 
 
? 
-0.227 
(-0.60) 
-0.259 
(-0.68) 
 
CFO 
 
? 
2.155 
(2.28)** 
2.154 
(2.29)** 
 
PPE 
 
? 
-0.660 
(-1.98)** 
-0.669 
(-1.99)** 
 
STD PL Ratio 
 
? 
0.018 
(0.41) 
0.017 
(0.38) 
N  1,670 1,670 
Pseudo 
R-Squared 
 0.1547 0.1523 
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Note: z-statistics in the parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. 
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively, based on a one- or 
two-tailed test, as appropriate. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Crss_Accl:      Indicator variable for public debt agreement that includes cross-
acceleration provisions; zero otherwise;  
PL Ratio_Rank: Tercile rank of the ratio of firm’s value of continued operation to 
liquidation value, where value of continued operation is calculated as 
market value of total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6- #60- #174+ #25* 
#199) and liquidation value is calculated as 0.715* accounts receivable 
(COMPUSTAT item #2) + 0.547* inventory (COMPUSTAT item #3) + 
0.535*PPE (COMPUSTAT item #8) + cash (COMPUSTAT item #1);  
SP Rate:  Transformation of S&P rating, from 1 (AAA) to 22 (D); 
STD Ret:      The standard deviation of the residuals from the market model using daily 
returns from the year before the debt issuance, requiring at least 100 
observations in the firm-year; 
Size: the natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT item #12);  
Repay_Rank:  Tercile rank of the ratio of long-term debt (COMPUSTAT item #9) plus 
the offering amount of the bond issuance to total debt ( long term debt 
COMPUSTAT item #9 + current debt #34) plus the offering amount of the 
bond; 
Accruals: The first principal component of three various absolute values of 
discretionary accruals (described in Appendix B); 
Herf: To construct this index, we calculate Herfindahl index for each loan deal 
issued by the firm by summing up the squared ownership by each bank, 
scaled by 10,000.  We then define Herf as the median of the Herfindahl 
index of these bank loans issued within 6 years before the issuance of the 
public debt; 
Lead Share:  The median percentage of the loan held by the lead arrangers’ for all of the 
bank loans issued within 6 years before the issuance of the public debt; 
Fin Cov:      The median number of financial covenants of the loans issued within 6 years 
before the issuance of the public debt; 
Maturity: The natural log of the loan’s maturity in months; 
Offer Size: The natural log of offering amount of the debt; 
Senior: Indicator variable equal to 1 if debt is senior, and zero otherwise;  
Leverage:      Total debt (COMPUSTAT item #9 + #34) over total assets (COMPUSTAT 
item #6); 
CFO:  Cash from operation (COMPUSTAT item #308) divided by lagged total 
assets (COMPUSTAT item #6);  
PPE:          Property, plant and equipment (COMPUSTAT item #8) divided by total 
assets (COMPUSTAT item #6); 
STD PL Ratio: The standard deviation of PL Ratio from the sample period. 
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Table 4  
Analysis of the effects of cross-acceleration provisions on the treasury spreads (as a 
spread over interest rates on t-notes of similar maturity) of public debt   
Variable  OLS Model Heckman Model  
 Predicted Sign Coefficient 
(T-stat) 
Coefficient 
(T-stat) 
 
Intercept 
? -176.743 
(-1.64) 
-108.732 
(-1.22) 
 
Crss_Accl 
 
- 
25.656 
(2.50)** 
-62.431 
(-1.99)** 
 
PL Ratio_Rank 
 
? 
-5.923 
(-1.36) 
-9.075 
(-2.27)** 
 
SP Rate 
 
+ 
16.948 
(7.84)*** 
190951 
(11.95)*** 
 
STD Ret 
 
+ 
3137.339 
(5.32)*** 
3232.831 
(8.80)*** 
 
Size 
 
- 
-4.657 
(-1.38)* 
-9.334 
(-2.99)*** 
 
Accruals 
 
+ 
-32.972 
(-1.47) 
-24.517 
(-1.50) 
Crss_Accl * 
Accruals 
 
+ 
53.641 
(2.20)** 
52.091 
(3.12)*** 
 
Maturity 
 
? 
12.258 
(4.26)*** 
12.381 
(3.00)*** 
 
Offer Size 
 
? 
4.246 
(0.89) 
5.376 
(1.19) 
 
Senior 
 
- 
-49.901 
(-2.35)** 
-53.411 
(-4.04)*** 
 
Leverage 
 
+ 
15.948 
(0.82) 
6.326 
(0.37) 
 
CFO 
 
- 
-62.065 
(-1.18) 
5.493 
(0.11) 
 
PPE 
 
- 
-18.597 
(-1.28) 
-39.876 
(-2.74)*** 
 
Credit Spread 
 
? 
107.535 
(6.82)*** 
97.713 
(5.95)*** 
 
Term Spread 
 
? 
-27.534 
(-6.47)*** 
-35.185 
(-7.63)*** 
Inverse Mills 
Ratio 
 
? 
 54.713 
(2.92)*** 
N  1,060 1,060 
R-Squared  0.5106 0.5154 
Note: t-statistics in the parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm 
level, standard errors in the Heckman model is adjusted using Maddala (1983) approach. 
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively, based on a one- or 
two-tailed test, as appropriate. 
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Variable Definitions: 
Crss_Accl:   Indicator variable for public debt agreement that includes cross- 
acceleration provisions; zero otherwise;  
PL Ratio_Rank: Tercile rank of the ratio of firm’s value of continued operation to 
liquidation value, where value of continued operation is calculated as 
market value of total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6- #60- #174+ #25* 
#199) and liquidation value is calculated as 0.715* accounts receivable 
(COMPUSTAT item #2) + 0.547* inventory (COMPUSTAT item #3) + 
0.535*PPE (COMPUSTAT item #8) + cash (COMPUSTAT item #1);  
SP Rate:  Transformation of S&P rating, from 1 (AAA) to 22 (D); 
STD Ret:      The standard deviation of the residuals from the market model using daily 
returns from the year before the debt issuance, requiring at least 100 
observations in the firm-year; 
Size: the natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT item #12);  
Accruals: The first principal component of three various absolute values of 
discretionary accruals (described in Appendix B); 
Fin Cov:      The median number of financial covenants of the loans issued within 6 years 
before the issuance of the public debt; 
Maturity: The natural log of the loan’s maturity in months; 
Offer Size: The natural log of offering amount of the debt; 
Senior: Indicator variable equal to 1 if debt is senior, and zero otherwise;  
Leverage:      Total debt (COMPUSTAT item #9 + #34) over total assets (COMPUSTAT 
item #6); 
CFO:  Cash from operation (COMPUSTAT item #308) divided by lagged total 
assets (COMPUSTAT item #6);  
PPE:          Property, plant and equipment (COMPUSTAT item #8) divided by total 
assets (COMPUSTAT item #6); 
Credit Spreads: Defined as the difference in yield between AAA and BAA corporate 
bonds; 
Term Spreads: Defined as the difference in yield between 10-year and 2-year T-notes; 
Inverse Mills Ratio: Calculated from a Probit model similar to Equation (1), where we 
include ownership Herfindahl of the loan as an instrumental variable. 
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Table 5 
Determinants of bank loan ownership Herfindahl index and lead arranger’s ownership as 
the first stage model for 2SLS estimations 
  Model 1 (Herf) Model 2 (Lead Share) 
VARIABLES Pred Sign Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
 
Intercept 
? 2.056 
(10.60)*** 
202.432 
(9.30)*** 
 
PL Ratio_Rank 
? 0.041 
(3.34)*** 
4.757 
(3.62)*** 
 
SP Rate 
+ 0.008 
(2.54)*** 
0.760 
(2.34)** 
 
STD Ret 
+ 1.960 
(3.36)*** 
165.542 
(2.37)** 
 
Size 
- 0.012 
(1.10) 
0.659 
(0.57) 
 
Repay_Rank 
? 0.024 
(2.08)** 
2.314 
(1.70)* 
 
PL Ratio_Rank* Repay_Rank 
? -0.015 
(-1.82)* 
-1.895 
(-2.04)** 
 
Accruals 
+ 0.022 
(1.28)* 
2.353 
(1.19) 
 
Fin Cov 
? -0.016 
(-2.64)*** 
-1.113 
(-1.64) 
 
Maturity (Public Debt) 
? -0.004 
(-0.77) 
-0.855 
(-1.54) 
 
Offer_Size (Public Debt) 
? 0.004 
(0.54) 
0.746 
(0.81) 
 
Senior (Public Debt) 
? -0.003 
(-0.14) 
-0.247 
(-0.11) 
 
Leverage 
? 0.012 
(0.33) 
1.553 
(0.38) 
 
CFO 
- 0.026 
(0.35) 
6.871 
(0.86) 
 
PPE 
- -0.038 
(-1.24) 
-4.832 
(-1.38)* 
 
STD PL Ratio 
          ? 0.000 
(0.07) 
-0.004 
(-0.18) 
 
Maturity (Loan) 
 
- 
-0.038 
(-3.11)*** 
-2.293 
(-1.65) 
 
Offer_Size (Loan) 
 
- 
-0.102 
(-9.00)*** 
-10.146 
(-8.32)*** 
 
$Ownership 
 
+ 
0.001 
(1.35)* 
0.035 
(1.75)** 
 
Market Flex 
 
- 
-0.046 
(-2.71)*** 
-1.120 
(-0.64) 
 55 
 
 
 
Note: t-statistics in the parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. 
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively, based on a one- or 
two-tailed test, as appropriate. 
 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Crss_Accl:   Indicator variable for public debt agreement that includes cross- 
acceleration provisions; zero otherwise;  
PL Ratio_Rank: Tercile ranking of PL Ratio, where PL Ratio is defined as the ratio of 
firm’s value of continued operation to liquidation value, where value of 
continued operation is calculated as market value of total assets 
(COMPUSTAT item #6- #60- #174+ #25* #199) and liquidation value is 
calculated as 0.715* accounts receivable (COMPUSTAT item #2) + 
0.547* inventory (COMPUSTAT item #3) + 0.535*PPE (COMPUSTAT 
item #8) + cash (COMPUSTAT item #1);  
Repay_Rank: Tercile ranking of Repay, where Repay is measured as the ratio of long-
term debt (COMPUSTAT item #9) plus the offering amount of the bond 
issuance to total debt (COMPUSTAT item #9 + #34) plus the offering 
amount of the bond; 
SP Rate:  Transformation of S&P rating, from 1 (AAA) to 22 (D); 
STD Ret:      The standard deviation of the residuals from the market model using daily 
returns from the year before the debt issuance, requiring at least 100 
observations in the firm-year; 
Size: the natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT item #12);  
Accruals: The first principal component of three various absolute values of 
discretionary accruals (described in Appendix B); 
Herf: To construct this index, we calculate Herfindahl index for each loan deal 
issued by the firm by summing up the squared ownership by each bank, 
scaled by 10,000.  We then define Herf as the median of the Herfindahl 
index of these bank loans issued within 6 years before the issuance of the 
public debt. 
Lead Share:  The median percentage of the loan held by the lead arrangers’ for all of the 
bank loans issued within 6 years before the issuance of the public debt; 
Fin Cov:      The median number of financial covenants of the loans issued within 6 years 
before the issuance of the public debt; 
Maturity: The natural log of the loan’s maturity in months; 
Offer Size: The natural log of offering amount of the debt; 
Senior: Indicator variable equal to 1 if debt is senior, and zero otherwise;  
Leverage:     Total debt (long term debt COMPUSTAT item #9 + current debt #34) over 
total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6); 
N  1,613 1,613 
Adj. R-squared  0.5409 0.4479 
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CFO:  Cash from operation (COMPUSTAT item #308) divided by lagged total 
assets (COMPUSTAT item #6); 
PPE:          Property, plant and equipment (COMPUSTAT item #8) divided by total 
assets (COMPUSTAT item #6); 
STD PL Ratio: Standard deviation of PL Ratio over the sample period; 
$Ownership:  For each loan, the lending limit is measured as the 75
th
 percentile of the 
dollar size of the lead bank’s share, calculated over the three years prior to 
the issuance date of that bank loan. We then define $Ownership as the 
median of the bank loans issued within 6 years before the issuance of the 
public debt.   
Market Flex:  Measured as the median of the indicator variable for bank loan issued 
after 1998 of the bank loans issued within 6 years before the issuance of 
the public debt. 
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Table 6 
Determinants of the use of cross-acceleration provisions in public debt agreements, with 
a 2SLS adjustment 
 
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 
 Pred 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(Z-Stat) 
Coefficient 
(Z-Stat) 
 
Intercept 
 
? 
-0.291 
(-0.20) 
-0.118 
(-0.08) 
 
PL Ratio_Rank 
 
- 
-0.263 
(-1.94)** 
-0.275 
(-1.99)** 
 
SP Rate 
 
+ 
0.050 
(1.31)* 
0.050 
(1.34)* 
 
STD Ret 
 
+ 
-5.053 
(-0.81) 
-3.799 
(-0.62) 
 
Size 
 
- 
-0.110 
(-1.45)* 
-0.109 
(-1.39)* 
 
Repay_Rank 
 
? 
-0.275 
(-0.21) 
-0.025 
(-0.19) 
PL Ratio_Rank* 
Repay_Rank 
 
+ 
0.170 
(1.73)** 
0.181 
(1.83)** 
 
Accruals 
 
+ 
0.319 
(2.04)** 
0.316 
(2.02)** 
 
Pre_Herf 
 
+ 
2.062 
(2.43)** 
 
 
Pre_Lead Share 
 
+ 
 0.019 
(2.14)** 
 
Fin Cov 
 
+ 
0.120 
(1.71)** 
0.098 
(1.44)* 
 
Maturity 
 
+ 
0.036 
(0.59) 
0.046 
(0.74) 
 
Offer Size 
 
? 
0.061 
(0.71) 
0.044 
(0.52) 
 
Senior 
 
+ 
-0.375 
(-1.79)* 
-0.383 
(-1.82)* 
 
Leverage 
 
? 
-0.274 
(-0.57) 
-0.286 
(-0.59) 
 
CFO 
 
? 
2.331 
(2.50)** 
2.263 
(2.45)** 
 
PPE 
 
? 
-0.550 
(1.59) 
-0.537 
(-1.54) 
 
STD PL Ratio 
 
? 
0.026 
(0.60) 
0.024 
(0.56) 
N  1,613 1,613 
Pseudo 
R- Squared 
 0.1684 0.1657 
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Note: z-statistics in the parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. 
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively, based on a one- or 
two-tailed test, as appropriate. 
 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Crss_Accl:      Indicator variable for public debt agreement that includes cross-
acceleration provisions; zero otherwise;  
PL Ratio_Rank: Tercile rank of the ratio of firm’s value of continued operation to 
liquidation value, where value of continued operation is calculated as 
market value of total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6- #60- #174+ #25* 
#199) and liquidation value is calculated as 0.715* accounts receivable 
(COMPUSTAT item #2) + 0.547* inventory (COMPUSTAT item #3) + 
0.535*PPE (COMPUSTAT item #8) + cash (COMPUSTAT item #1);  
SP Rate:  Transformation of S&P rating, from 1 (AAA) to 22 (D); 
STD Ret:      The standard deviation of the residuals from the market model using daily 
returns from the year before the debt issuance, requiring at least 100 
observations in the firm-year; 
Size: the natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT item #12);  
Repay_Rank:  Tercile rank of the ratio of long-term debt (COMPUSTAT item #9) plus 
the offering amount of the bond issuance to total debt ( long term debt 
COMPUSTAT item #9 + current debt #34) plus the offering amount of the 
bond; 
Accruals: The first principal component of three various absolute values of 
discretionary accruals (described in Appendix B); 
Pre_Lead Share:  Predicted value of lead arrangers’ ownership from the two-stage-least-
squared model. 
Pre_Herf: Predicted value of the Herf from the two-stage-least-squared model. 
Fin Cov:      The median number of financial covenants of the loans issued within 6 years 
before the issuance of the public debt; 
Maturity: The natural log of the loan’s maturity in months; 
Offer Size: The natural log of offering amount of the debt; 
Senior: Indicator variable equal to 1 if debt is senior, and zero otherwise;  
Leverage:      Total debt (COMPUSTAT item #9 + #34) over total assets (COMPUSTAT 
item #6); 
CFO:  Cash from operation (COMPUSTAT item #308) divided by lagged total 
assets (COMPUSTAT item #6);  
PPE:          Property, plant and equipment (COMPUSTAT item #8) divided by total 
assets (COMPUSTAT item #6); 
STD PL Ratio: The standard deviation of PL Ratio from the sample period. 
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